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ABSTRACT
In the context of ongoing debates about the distinctive temporalities
associated with contemporary regulative regimes, this paper
explores the interpretive trajectories initiated in contrasting
conceptualisations of the politics of time. This exploration is
developed through analysis of interview data from a study of
unconscious relations in academic practice. Section one uses one
moment of data to contrast phenomenological, Deleuzian and
Lacanian theorisations of the relation between time and
subjectivity. Section two is an exegesis of Lacan’s paper on Logical
Time. This outlines the way temporality is structured in relation to
the subject’s guess about the expectations of the Other. Section
three uses this to develop an interpretation of three temporalities
that constitute the space of contemporary academic subjectivities.
The ﬁnal section considers the intensiﬁcation of the juxtaposition
of these incongruent temporalities, contrasting Lacanian and
Deleuzian theorisations of time in the Real/virtual and their
implications for both methodological and political strategy.
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Introduction: the politics of time and the subject
In the context of ongoing debates about the distinctive temporalities associated with con-
temporary regulative regimes, this paper explores the interpretive trajectories initiated in
contrasting conceptualisations of the politics of time. The discussion is situated in relation
to Deleuze’s (1995) theorisation of the contrast between the disciplinary mechanisms of
the modern state and contemporary societies of control, and Bernstein’s (2000) analysis
of the contrast between competence and performance pedagogies. Both these analyses
foreground the way practices of surveillance and observation within contemporary regu-
lative processes reconstitute temporal relations in professional practice.
In his brief, rhetorical and inﬂuential essay ‘Postscript on Control Societies’, Deleuze
(1995) argues that the disciplinary processes associated with the modern state are
being overwritten with mechanisms associated with a society of control. A key feature
of this shift is the displacement of hierarchically positioned professional subjects by
digital and administrative systems: processes that used to be constituted in relation to
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substantive objectives of bounded institutions are now more frequently unbounded,
emptied out, lacking clearly deﬁned goals or end points (Deleuze, 1995, pp. 179–181).
This coincides with a decrease in the grip of disciplinary modes of observation or surveil-
lance that have been conceptualised as central to the mechanisms of production of the
modern subject. Disciplinary surveillance emerges within delimited spatial relations
through the application of professional knowledge to deﬁne the interiority of the
subject (Foucault, 1977; Lazzarato, 2006; Savat, 2009). In contrast the administrative mech-
anisms of surveillance within a society of control are exercised at a distance, compiling
large scale quantitative data. Savat (2009) foregrounds digital technologies as an exemp-
lary mode of synchronous observation and recording in which ‘one always already writes
or constitutes oneself as code’ (p. 50). This mode of surveillance also shifts temporal
relations: whereas disciplinary modes of observation are focused on the application of pro-
fessional knowledge within a present relation, surveillance within mechanisms of control
works at a distance to produce a predictive relation to a projected future subjectivity. Fur-
thermore, these predictions are not stable; they constantly shift as new data is incorpor-
ated into the recorded observation.
Bernstein’s model of contrasting pedagogies resonates with this Deleuzian analysis. In
Class and Pedagogies: visible and invisible, Bernstein (1975) argued that modern child-
centred pedagogies are enacted through teachers’ covert surveillance of children’s activity,
which they interpret through the lens of pedagogical theories of development and learn-
ing. Child-centred pedagogies thus constitute the present interiority of the child through
the teacher’s professional interpretation of meanings within the child’s activities. Bern-
stein’s later analysis contrasted ‘professional’ with ‘neoliberal’/‘performance’ pedagogic
identities, describing the former as ‘driven by inner dedication’ and the latter as ‘an out-
wardly responsive identity’ (2000, p. 69). The ‘performance’model of pedagogy associated
with ‘neoliberal’ identities no longer focuses on the child’s activity and inner development.
Instead, pedagogy is articulated in relation to externally deﬁned criteria, which constitute
absences to be diagnosed and repaired in the child’s performance of tasks, so the texts
that they produce are required to progress in quality in line with these external expec-
tations. Thus Bernstein suggests: ‘in the case of performance models, the future is made
visible, but that which has constructed this future is a past invisible to the acquirer’
(2000, p. 48). The data used to construct national and individual targets or ‘expected
levels’ in contemporary classrooms are an exemplary production of the new modes of sur-
veillance described by Savat, and also of their predictive relation to future identities.
These accounts of shifting mechanisms of production of practices and identities, and
the displacement of professional objectives by administrative processes of ‘endless post-
ponement’ (Deleuze, 1995, p. 179), have implications for our understanding of services
across the public sector (McGimpsey, 2012; Thompson & Cook, 2014). They also provide
the context for my exploration of the temporalities of academic research practice and sub-
jectivities. The paper develops two main arguments. A more empirical argument interprets
three contrasting temporalities in academics’ accounts of their practice; it suggests an
intensiﬁcation of juxtapositions of bizarrely incongruent temporalities, as we are increas-
ingly caught up in processes associated with a society of control. A more methodological
argument plays with the contrasting interpretive trajectories opened up by different
theorisations of ‘time’. The paper attempts to maintain an in-between position, avoiding
reiﬁcation of any one epistemological frame. My overall aim is to avoid any sense of a
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ﬁnalized conception of ‘time’; but at the same time to use philosophical accounts that
conceptualise duration as an animating force in static materiality (Grosz, 2000, p. 230) to
open up ways of seeing academic practice as an instance of more generalised political
formations.
The politics of time and subjectivity: three interpretive trajectories
The analysis in this paper was initiated by a sense of contrasting temporalities in partici-
pants’ accounts in an interview-based project exploring psychical or unconscious relations
in academic methodologies. The project was explicitly designed to explore the recontex-
tualisation of psychoanalytic approaches in research interviews. This informed the con-
struction of both temporal and interactional aspects of the interviews.
Participants, eight academics working in the humanities and social sciences, were
initially selected to represent disciplines with contrasting objects, methodologies and
ﬁelds of applications. Six of the eight were based in selective, research intensive insti-
tutions. All were research active and had experience of the most recent national research
assessment process. They were interviewed eight times each, over a period of up to two
years. For each interview they were asked to provide a text that in some way related to
their ﬁeld of research, which became the initial prompt for the interview: ‘Say something
about the text that you have chosen’. The aim was to produce free associative material, but
also to avoid the traditional psychoanalytic focus on biography, instead attending to the
relation between the subject and their research practice. During the interviews I
attempted to maintain something like ‘evenly hovering attentiveness’ (see, e.g. Bollas,
1999). My interventions were intended to elicit additional associations, or to offer my
initial interpretations. As far as possible these interpretations were presented as provi-
sional and playful, rather than authoritative; intended to draw participants’ attention to
connections and associations in their narration of their practice, and to provide opportu-
nities for them to elaborate or reﬁne these very provisional interpretations.
My analysis of this data has drawn on psychoanalytic and psychoanalytically informed
social theory, from a predominantly Lacanian perspective (Lapping, 2013a, 2013b). The
analysis offered here also engages primarily with Lacanian ideas. However, my aim is to
keep other theorisations of time in play, to maintain a sense of contingency in relation
to the different interpretive and political trajectories that they open up. This is important
as a strategy for keeping in mind the provisional, complementary and incommensurable
status of all epistemologies (Lapping, 2015; Plotnitsky, 1994).
The most pertinent line of differentiation in marking out these theories is the possibi-
lities they construct for conceptualising a subject that is distinct from temporality. Are time
and conscious temporal experience in some way external to the subject of consciousness
and temporality? Or are prolongation and duration inherent to the very possibility of the
subject? In parallel to these questions there are different positions on whether continuous
duration, with its stabilising effect on identities, is given or constructed. More realist phe-
nomenological approaches conceptualise the continuous duration of time as a given that
is subjectively mediated through a consciousness that structures the subject’s experience
of temporality. Approaches that question the unity of the subject can also be associated
with a critique of continuity, seeing continuity as a construction that supports the
fantasy of uniﬁed identity. Both Deleuze and Lacan can be associated with this position.
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The interpretive trajectories suggested by these contrasting theorisations can be
explored by looking at a moment from one interview. This moment suggests a preliminary
delineation of contrasting temporalities in the participant’s research practice. B, an early
career researcher who was in the middle of her ﬁrst major funded research project,
explained how this new position affected her relation to writing and publication:
Because this is a funded research, I mean, it has to have an output, because of its connection to
the public funding that it receives. And I think I will say, for this particular project I’m more
aware of, like, having a publication plan, than I would have for just my own – I mean, there
is lots of stuff that I’m thinking I’d like to work on, but I have no clear agenda of when and
how I will write those papers. Whereas, with this one, I’m actually feeling a little bit more
responsible of having a plan. So it’s not how I usually work. I think the way I would usually
work would be a bit more organic and things sort of unfold. (B, Interview 2)
Her account invokes temporality as she contrasts the ‘publication plan’ associated with
her current project with the ‘no clear agenda’ of her usual practice. From a realist, phe-
nomenological perspective, this kind of account might be interpreted to explore the
structuring of consciousness, and to trace, for example, B’s conscious awareness of
different aspects of what might perhaps be thought of as objective ‘time’. It would
be possible, for example, to interpret a foregrounding in consciousness of a linear, pro-
gressive temporality, in the formulation of a ‘publication plan’. This might be con-
trasted with the B’s usual absorption in a more ‘organic’ or recursive temporal
dimension, in which ‘things sort of unfold’. It would also be possible to trace B’s
relation to these contrasting temporalities. She articulated, for example, a sense of
alienation from her own project: ‘I’m treating something that I actually have created
– I just completely came up with this research – as if it was something that was
there and I’m kind of working for it’ (B, Interview 2). Through this kind of analysis we
might gradually begin to map a subjective experience of temporality within the struc-
tures of consciousness; and explore way these structures produce distinct subjective
identities with shifting relations to both ‘time’ and research.
Politically, this kind of approach can help to foreground a ‘desynchronization’ of the
temporalities of diverse social, cultural and psychical spheres (Clancy, 2014; Rosa, 2013;
Vostal, 2014). In B’s account this might refer to a break between the temporalities of
funded and unfunded research. From a Heideggerian perspective, Clancy suggests,
both these temporalities might be understood as removed from originary temporality,
and thus associated with reduced opportunities for authentic engagement, in a way
that is associated with psychological harm (Clancy, 2014, p. 34). Political or therapeutic
interventions might be conducted at either an individual or a collective level, and work
to unsettle taken for granted, conscious relations to time (p. 39). The aim, however, is to
produce ‘temporal coherence’ (p. 42) through a more authentic relation to originary
temporality that also, in Vostal’s (2014) formulation in the context of academic work
in higher education, recognises subjects’ differentiated experience of time in relation
to complex sociological variables (p. 19). The danger is that this collapses into an indi-
vidualised demand that fails to engage with the speciﬁc conditions of the observed
‘desynchronization’.
A more Deleuzian framing would direct attention to the relational construction of an
appearance of unity and temporal continuity. This appearance is produced through
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processes of contemplation and contraction, through which habitual relations between
organic elements become established as an ‘assemblage’. Using the Deleuzian language
of ‘assemblage’, in B’s account wemight interpret one ‘researcher-assemblage’ constituted
in a habituated contemplation/contraction between B’s ‘stuff that I’m thinking I’d like to
work on’ and her yet-to-be written ‘papers’; and another ‘researcher-assemblage’ in habi-
tuated contemplation/contraction between a publication plan, funding, and, B’s account
also suggested, a new relation of responsibility for a researcher on her funded project
(Interview 2).
The temporality of these assemblages might be understood in terms of Deleuze’s
(2004) ﬁrst, passive synthesis of time. This, he says, ‘constitutes time as a living present’
(p. 97). His conception of a present temporality as the product of synthesis can be under-
stood as a critique of continuity as given. It is informed by Bergson’s and Dedekind’s phi-
losophical and mathematical critiques of the conﬂation of extensive, quantiﬁable space
with intensive movement or continuity (Olma, 2006; Voss, 2013). The key point is that
time is not a succession of instants, and that the intensive quality of continuity is not
given, but contingently produced through the organic process of contemplation, habit
and contraction. The apparently uniﬁed and continuous entity of researcher identity/
assemblage is the outcome of habitual contractions between body parts, funding, publi-
cation plans, papers, co-researchers. Through a process of organic contemplation actions
contract into habituated repetitions: ‘When we say that habit is a contraction we are speak-
ing… of the fusion of that repetition in the contemplating mind’ (Deleuze, 2004, p. 95; see
also Bignall, 2010, pp. 14–15). The repetition itself is an imaginary product of contempla-
tion, which contracts its objects so that they appear as repeated instances of the same
element (Deleuze, 2004, p. 97).
The concept of duration here relates to the continuity resulting from habit, and Deleuze
says, ‘The duration of an organism’s present…will vary according to the natural contrac-
tile range of its contemplative souls’ (p. 98). That is: the present endures just as long as the
contracted relations between the contemplated elements brought together in the assem-
blage. This duration, though, appears in a variety of forms: ‘All our rhythms, our reserves,
our reaction times, the thousand intertwinings, the presents and fatigues of which we are
composed, are deﬁned on the basis of our contemplations’ (p. 98). So contemplation, habit
and duration might be understood as the unconscious conditions of multiple temporal
forms. Or, rather than interpreting contrasting ‘temporalities’ in B’s account, we might
instead talk about one ‘rhythm’ constituted in linear and recursive relations. The natural-
isation of these relations is politically important: the passive synthesis is trapped in the
habitual repetition of the ‘natural’ signs and rhythms that constitute the living present.
Politics requires the artiﬁcial construction of new signs or rhythms: materialities produced
through desirous, active syntheses of time (see Bignall, 2010).
Deleuze’s conception of the organic processes of contemplation and contraction as
unconscious conditions of the living present offers one perspective on the unconscious
conditions of duration. Lacan offers a contrasting conceptualisation of the unconscious
conditions of temporality. He maps the relation between subjectively experienced dur-
ation and the dispersed signifying elements that constitute subjectivity by channelling
the forces of desire and ‘time’. This Lacanian framework draws attention to the network
of signiﬁers, the big Other (see Hook, 2008), in relation to which the shifting temporalities
of B’s research emerge. B’s more explicit publication plan relates both to the ambiguous
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demand of the funder of her project and to her new position of responsibility in relation to
the project researcher. Importantly, though, there is no suggestion that either the funder
or the researcher speciﬁed the necessity to work with the kind of awareness of a publi-
cation plan that is suggested in B’s account. Lacan draws attention to the way we con-
stantly make guesses about the desire of the Other (‘What does the Other want from
me?’); and to the way these guesses are also constituted as a channel for our own recurring
and idiosyncratic patterns of desire. For example, in B’s interviews there was a recurring
motif of a pleasurable oscillation between mess and order. Her response to the gaze of
the funder and of her researcher as signiﬁers of big Other, imposing the linear temporality
of a publication plan, might thus be interpreted as a repetition of this familiar oscillation.
From a Lacanian perspective we might read this repetition as indicative of an-other,
unconscious and a-temporal desire.
For Lacan, then, the phenomenological subject or consciousness is not the primary
condition for a subjective temporal experience of an authentic or objective time.
Instead we can see the naturalised phenomenological experience of the subject as con-
stituted in a web of unconscious relations to the network of signiﬁers, the big Other, and
to desire. The unconscious conditions of temporality, theorised by Deleuze (from the
perspective of the organism) and Lacan (from the perspective of the subject) disinte-
grate any sense of a uniﬁed ego or phenomenological subject as a primary condition
of temporality; and disaggregate the dispersed elements bound together as the natur-
alized continuity and durational temporal experience of the subject. The next section
develops an exegesis of Lacan’s paper on Logical Time. More than anything else I
have read, this paper makes visible the workings of the exceedingly peculiar experience
that is temporality.
Lacan’s story of logical time
In ‘Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty’, Lacan (2006) uses a prisoner’s
dilemma to explore the function of symbolic structures and the gaze of the other in the
production of temporality and subjectivity. A logical puzzle is presented to three
inmates: they are shown ﬁve discs, two black, three white. The warden will fasten one
disc to each prisoner’s back; they will be left in a room to consider, but forbidden from
communicating amongst each other. The ﬁrst to leave the room able to tell the warden
the colour of her disc ‘founded upon logical and not simply probabilistic grounds’
(p. 198), will be freed. Having explained the task, the warden ﬁxes a white disc to each
inmate’s back.
Lacan’s discussion of this scenario develops a thesis about the relation between time,
subjectivity and the o/Other: an imaginary, uniﬁed other or reciprocal subjectivity; or the
big Other of institutionalized structures or language. The key point I want to foreground,
initially, is the dialectical moves Lacan depicts between the subjective experience of dur-
ation/hesitation and the objectiﬁcation of this experience in what he calls Logical Time.
Objectiﬁed time here is not, of course, clock time, or time unmediated by social interfer-
ence. Logical Time is represented by a structural hesitation without a delimited duration.
Subjective time, in contrast, is the subject’s experience of duration. The points I want to
explain, then, are:
6 C. LAPPING
. The role of hesitation in interrupting, or ‘scanding’ (Lacan’s term, see Fink, 1997), the
prisoners’ movement to the exit.
. The subject’s speculation on the thought process of the o/Other.
. The shifts between subjective experience of hesitation as temporal duration and objec-
tiﬁed understanding of hesitation as Logical Time.
. The meaning of, and relation between, ‘subjective’ and ‘objective’ time in Lacan’s
account.
Lacan’s (2006) account is an expansion/explosion of what he describes as the ‘sophistic’ sol-
ution to the logical puzzle. This solution suggests that, after contemplating for ‘a certain time’
(and the simultaneous speciﬁcity and ambiguity of ‘a certain time’ is pertinent) each of the three
prisoners moves towards the door, at the samemoment, and each offers the same explanation:
I am a white, and here is how I know it. Since my companions were whites, I thought that, had I
been a black, each of them would have been able to infer the following: ‘If I too were a black,
the other would necessarily have realized straight away that he was a white and would have
left immediately; therefore I am not a black’. And both would have left together, convinced
they were whites. As they did nothing of the kind, I must be a white like them. At that I
made for the door to make my conclusion known. (p. 162)
Lacan’s expansion/explosion of this solution – in which he claims ‘the philosopher’s garb’,
associated with ‘the comedian’s banter’ and the ‘politician’s secretive action’ (p. 163) –
draws attention to three moments: modes of duration that interrupt or modulate the
unity or meaning of ‘a certain time’.
In the ﬁrst moment, the moment of the glance, the subject, seeing two whites, excludes
the only scenario offering certainty about her identity: that is, it is immediately apparent
that it is not the case that ‘I must be white because I see two blacks’. The prisoner does not
need to consider the thought processes of her peers in order to make this ﬁrst logical
exclusion. The instantaneous logical inference of this ﬁrst moment, Lacan points out, is
constituted in imaginary identiﬁcation with an generalized ‘other’, a noetic, reasoning or
intellectual subject: ‘one who knows that’ (p. 170).
In the second moment, the subject develops a hypothesis, based on the ﬁrst logical exclu-
sion, which she now imaginatively inserts into the thinking process of the two other inmates
to produce the solution outlined above: the result of which being that the hesitation of the
two others convinces the subject that she is white. This is the moment of comprehending,
which presupposes a duration, the time taken for each to meditate on the possibilities:
that is, the subject attributes a certain duration as appropriate for this meditation in her
interpretation of the hesitation of her peers. Where the experience of temporality in the
moment of the glance is constituted in identiﬁcation with a generalized speculating
subject; in themoment of comprehending, the experience of temporality – that is, the duration
of the hesitation – is constituted in imaginary identiﬁcation with a speciﬁc other – her fellow
prisoners. Of this second stage of the hypothesizing process, Lacan comments:
The objectivity of this time thus vacillates with its limits. Its meaning alone subsists, along with
the form it engenders of subjects who are undeﬁned except by their reciprocity… (p. 168,
emphasis in original)
The meaning of the hesitation Lacan suggests, is ﬁxed, within the logical scenario, that is,
the hesitation leads the subject to comprehend that she must be white; but the duration of
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the hesitation vacillates, or is not yet ﬁxed at this point of the scenario. This vacillation has
its effect, and produces a third temporal moment.
In the third moment, the subject reﬂects that if she is in fact a black, then her two peers
will conclude their speculations a moment before her, since they have one less stage in
their hypothesizing. This produces an urgency for the subject to move from the
moment of comprehending to the moment of concluding, to ensure that the others do
not conclude ahead of her – which would throw into doubt her conclusion that she is
white. The moment of concluding thus involves a certain urgency and a move to action.
The urgency, though, Lacan clariﬁes, is not, as some have suggested (Johnston, 2005,
p. 28) to do with the opportunity for release, but rather is dependent on the logical
meaning of movement in this concluding temporality:
It is thus not because of some dramatic contingency, the seriousness of the stakes, or the com-
petitiveness of the game, that time presses; it is owing to [sous] the urgency of the logical
movement that the subject precipitates both his judgment and his departure .… (Lacan,
2006, p. 169)
The urgency relates to the imminent possibility that the time of comprehending might
‘lose its meaning’ (p. 169). It is thus more existential than the speciﬁcs of the prison scen-
ario, it relates to the possibility of a name, an identity, or a ﬁxed relation to a signiﬁer. The
urgency is an urgency, and a temporality, common to all subjectivity.
It is important to recognise the combination of frivolity and seriousness in Lacan’s
account. He is deliberately exploding the sophistry of the logical puzzle, demonstrating
how it relies on a ridiculous assumption of reciprocity between subjects. However, his
demonstration of the way we experience temporality in relation to a guess about the
expectations of an unknowable o/Other, and to the existential urgency of ﬁnding and
ﬁxing a name, is quite serious. So it is important to note that whereas in the moment of
the glance and in the moment of comprehending there was reciprocity between subject
and other, in themoment of concluding the subject has to make a ﬁnal subjective assertion
on their own behalf: ‘I am white’. This replicates the psychological move from Imaginary
identiﬁcation with a reciprocal other to Symbolic identiﬁcation with language or structural
authority. Making this point, Lacan notes how the subjective assertion of the moment of
concluding is analogous to the initial psychological formation of the subject in language:
The ‘I’ subject of the conclusive assertion, is isolated from the other – that is, from the relation
of reciprocity – by a logical beat. This movement of the logical genesis of the ‘I’ through a
process of decanting of its own logical time largely parallels its psychological birth. (p. 170)
Lacan’s Logical Time helps us to notice the role of the o/Other in the construction of tem-
poral experience. It distinguishes between a generalised imaginary other, a speciﬁc ima-
ginary other, and the symbolic Other or structure of signiﬁers that captures or ﬁxes the
subject in language. It also illustrates the way that punctuations – here in the form of inter-
ruption or hesitation in ‘a certain time’ – bring about a shift in meaning (‘scansion’ in
Lacan’s terms). The temporal experiences of duration or urgency are (a) produced in
relation to an o/Other, and (b) inherent to the process of identiﬁcation or capture as a
subject of a signifying system with a diachronic structuring of meaning.
The additional distinction between ‘time’ and ‘temporality’ is also worth noting. In part,
Lacan’s aim in the paper is to subvert or avoid the phenomenological distinction between
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objective ‘time’ and subjective ‘temporality’. He aims to do this by disrupting the assumed
synchronicity of logic, by demonstrating the necessity of the diachronic durational hesita-
tions to the logical scenario (Johnston, 2005, pp. 32–33; Lacan, 2006, p. 10). However, John-
ston suggests that Lacan’s aim is not fulﬁlled, because the durational instances are
constituted and recuperated by the overarching logical form of the puzzle:
Lacan’s temporal logic is a false temporality, a staged time in which the diachronic unfolding
of crucial moments is immanent to the synchronic script of the grand Autre. (2005, p. 33)
He argues that the ‘Logical Time’ paper on its own does not present a psychoanalytic
theory of ‘time’ as such. The exploration of temporality within the structure of the
logical puzzle might rather be seen as a parodic or hyperbolic illustration of the fantas-
matic status of temporal/durational experience, and of the impossibility of a direct
engagement with anything we might inappropriately name as Real Time.
I would want to add a rider to this reading of Lacan’s argument as wholly re-
absorbed into the synchronic structure of the puzzle. The very metaphor of the
prison, with its seductive narrative drama, alongside Lacan’s other contextualising allu-
sions, undercut the presumed universality of structure, offering glimpses of its more
paradoxical aspect (cf. Butler, Laclau, & Zizek, 2000; Dolar, 2015). Nevertheless, the
structural aspects of Lacan’s theory are productive for an understanding of temporality
in a society of control.
The structural conditions of temporality
My analysis of participants’ accounts of their research practice suggests how the relation to
an o/Other can be understood as productive of contrasting subjective experiences of dur-
ation in contemporary higher education institutions. These might be distinguished as
chronological, teleological and narcissistic modes of temporality.
The production of chronological temporality in identiﬁcation with signiﬁers of
perpetual process
The constitution of duration in relation to the UK research evaluation exercise provides an
obvious example of the way temporality can be implicated in the loosening of institutional
boundaries and emptying out of substantive objectives associated with Deleuze’s ‘mech-
anisms of control’. Under the previous block grant system, the formula used by the UK Uni-
versity Grants Committee (UGC) to distribute funds was deliberately not published, in
order that universities would continue to base the internal distribution of resources on
their own principles, rather than those of the external body (Brown, 2013). Despite the
invisible (cf. Bernstein, 1975) control exercised by the UGC, this can be understood as a
reiteration of an institutional identity, the university, with substantive values beyond the
criteria articulated by the funding body. The models of funding that replaced this
system allocate resources via regular assessment exercises and in relation to explicit, pub-
lished criteria of research quality (Brown, 2013, p. 53). This projection of externally deﬁned
deadlines into the university also has implications for temporality, punctuating research
practice with a-synchronous criteria that reconstitute duration as an explicit linear chron-
ology of ambiguous expectations.
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The explicit chronology of research evaluation was directly referenced in interview
accounts. The replacement of institutional criteria of value with external indicators of
quality was also referenced, interpreted as a restriction on both scholarly and pedagogic
production. F’s account, for example, constituted a fantasy of a previous era of uninter-
rupted duration for research:
There are two professors who were my heads of department when I was an undergraduate
and in their whole lifetimes they published one massive book each, one really important
book in their ﬁeld, and some small articles, maybe kind of three or four. (Interview 1)
This contrasted with her account of the way the assessment exercises punctuated her
research with deadlines and targets. Asked if she was happy with her own writing, she
responded:
No, God, you know, in the next four years I’ve got to produce two books and two big articles,
and in the four years after that I’ve probably got to produce two more and two more. I’m 46
now, and if I work for another 20 years, that’s ﬁve more sets, that’s ten more books that I’ve got
to produce. And there’s no way I’ve got more than ten times more to say than my old pro-
fessors have. (Interview 1)
In addition to the explicit chronology, F’s account interprets the meaning of temporal
punctuations in terms of signiﬁcance of research output. Participant C’s account similarly
referenced the chronological frame of the accountability exercise, ‘RAE’, that punctuated
his practice, but interpreted its meaning in terms of restrictions on genre:
Colleagues have said to me ‘don’t waste your time with textbooks because it doesn’t work,
RAE-wise’ … This is a book written during that period, but it didn’t go in as one of my four
publications, because it was a text book. (Interview 1)
Participant E’s account suggested an alternative interpretation of the meaning of chrono-
logical interruptions. Here the punctuation of the external evaluation process appeared to
intensify an existing institutional demand for disciplinary identiﬁcation. She explained how
her research fell between two ﬁelds, and described this as ‘high maintenance’, especially in
relation to the RAE:
This kind of came during the Research Assessment Exercise, you know, there were concerns
about whether some of the stuff we should put with law and some of the stuff with politics
… there were doubts, not about whether it was good or not, but maybe it feeds into that as
well. (Interview 1)
The Other here is represented by the extra-institutional timetable of the Research Assess-
ment Exercise, and the subjectively experienced temporality of research is constituted in
relation to each participant’s guess about what this Other desires of them. There is an
apparent clarity in the chronological punctuations that reconstitute the linear temporality
of research. However, the object of this chronological demand is ambiguous: since the
exercise aims at selective attribution of prestige, it is not desirable for everyone to
conform. The message is further confused by the empty criteria of perpetual process, inter-
preted variously as ‘dumb down!’, ‘smarten up!’, ‘ﬁt in!’. We might say that within this
dimension of temporality, chronology is foregrounded, while substantive teleology is rela-
tively obscure.
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The production of teleological temporality in identiﬁcation with signiﬁers of
substantive value
In the face of uncertainty, C’s account vacillated in a way that, following Lacan’s logic, we
might read as indicative of the urgency of a loss of subjectivity. His account references
points of reassurance in relations to media and to political consultancy: ‘A non-academic
… invited me for lunch, and it became clear that he thought my paper was the best thing
that had been written in the area’ (Interview 4). However, as well as reassurance, these
relations constituted an additional layer of temporally inﬂected linear demand: ‘I just
have to keep up… and, you know, that’s a constant, it’s two hours a day you’d have to
spend reading the papers… the media phone you up, you’ve got to know everything’
(Interview 2). The ﬁnancial incentive associated with consultancy – ‘I need the money,
the bottom line is of course that one has to earn a living’ (Interview 2) – connotes
another level of existential urgency in the temporality invoked in C’s account. It is possible
to interpret the ﬁelds of media and consultancy as offering a more substantive, if transi-
tory, point of recognition, with a clear teleology beyond perpetual process.
For most participants, more obvious substantive points of identiﬁcation were within
strongly institutionalized methodological or academic systems of value. They referred to
methodological frameworks, theoretical afﬁliations, and canonical texts and authors; as
well as connections with journals, conferences, or established groups of researchers
within their ﬁeld. Participants F and M, both in literary studies, referenced ‘historicism’
as a major point of identiﬁcation for their work. They named key authors or terms as sig-
niﬁers of sources and controversial positions within contemporary debates. Their accounts
also described relations to co-authors and to colleagues with shared interests who they
met regularly at conferences. Similarly, participant G, a historian, positioned his research
in an account that juxtaposed the inﬂuence of his PhD supervisor, alternative theories,
and a contrast between generalizing versus particularistic methodologies. Like F and M,
he also described speciﬁc interactions at recent scholarly events. These instances indicate
chains of signiﬁers of methodological and academic position that constitute both substan-
tive objectives and points of identiﬁcation for researcher subjectivities.
In terms of duration and urgency, relations to signiﬁers within these chains constitute a
variety of temporalities. The sense of duration produced in imaginary relation to ideas and
colleagues frequently appears as one of continuity and stability. In addition, punctuations
to this duration are constituted in relation to a certain level of reciprocity of expectations
about regularity of meetings, timing of feedback, and submission of writing. There is,
however, still uncertainty associated with the meaning of durational limits. G had recently
sent a draft paper to some colleagues and noted: ‘They’ve had the piece about a week
now, and I’ll be less nervous when they write back’ (Interview 3). The uncertain subjective
temporality of colleagues as reciprocal others, we might say, temporarily casts them in the
role of big Other of disciplinary judgment. Relations to methodological signiﬁers of the dis-
ciplinary big Other could also produce vacillations in durational limits. M, for example,
reﬂected that her identiﬁcation with historicism was sometimes too categorical (Interview
6) and this produced an existential temporal tension, as the next diachronic move in her
narrative of her methodological position was cast into uncertainty (Lapping, 2011,
pp. 129–130). There is a substantive teleology to these temporalities, which relates to
security of position within a combination of methodological and intellectual ﬁelds.
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To return to the sociological productivity of this analysis: my suggestion is that signiﬁers
of methodological and academic practice constitute more substantive, enduring con-
ditions of temporality than the empty, ambiguous processes associated with societies of
control. While they carve out different trajectories of duration and intensity, both sets of
conditions constitute a largely linear subjective experience. This linearity is differentiated
by a foregrounding of chronological (perpetual process) or teleological (discipline)
aspects. However, within both sets of conditions, a sense of futurity is constituted via
points of identiﬁcation, signiﬁers, whose meanings are ﬁxed within discourses that
precede and subsist in relative independence of the individualised subject (cf. Bernstein,
2000; Savat, 2009). This is not the case with the more narcissistic temporality of embedded
research practice.
The production of narcissistic temporality in identiﬁcation with signiﬁers
produced in the practice of research
My exploration of temporality was initiated by sections of my participants’ accounts that
suggested an intense build-up of relations to speciﬁc texts or practices related to the pro-
jects they were working on, resulting in a tacit presence of amassed potential connections.
These extracts suggested a cumulative, continuous duration, constituted within this
intense set of relations. These relations appeared recursive, with connections emerging
within present activity, rather than in relation to a prior chronology or objective. As
opposed to a linear drive forward, these accounts depicted a more suspended, back
and forth temporality, without an explicit sense of futurity. Several narratives of this tem-
porality included associations to a sense of retreat, nurture or insulation from other aspects
of their practice (Lapping, 2013b). The question suggested by the Lacanian logic of tem-
porality is: in relation to which ‘other’ is this sense of recursive, nurturing, or narcissistic
temporality constituted?
Participant B’s account of carrying out the interviews for her project exempliﬁes the
construction of a sense of a continuous and cumulative duration:
The interviews are quite, it has a very cumulative effect in terms of understanding them…
now it is almost over a hundred interviews… and it has happened through time and I partici-
pated in almost all of them. So I was there doing the interviews, which is great, because in
another interview you constantly sort of add them back to back, you know, I rephrased ques-
tions with the next person and the next person. And I constantly think through the data, even
during the interview process, and you make connections one to the other. (Interview 2)
The account describes a ‘cumulative effect’ that has ‘happened through time’. The phra-
seology of ‘the next person and the next person’, might be said to replicate or reiterate
a sense of cumulative and similar instances; repetitions of ‘constantly’ and ‘I’ add to the
fantasmatic, symbolically structured, sense of continuous duration.
There are similar features in F’s account of her sense of loss in relation to the project she
had been working on at the time of our previous interview but had not been able to
continue:
It rather upsets me to think about the reading I did on that project, because I’d have to do it
again, because it would be so long after the fact that although the structures of understanding
are there, the cobwebby stuff that research is like, you know, just those delicate threads that
are kind of hanging in your mind when you’re in it, are what go very quickly… Because you,
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it’s all that stuff you don’t even know that you’re thinking when you’re working on something
else, and then that thing, I don’t know, lights up or the connection comes, and then it
becomes, you realise you were thinking it.… (Interview 4)
This foregrounds the effect of an intense period of reading that results in a spatialized
image of amassed ‘cobwebby’ understanding: ‘those delicate threads that are just kind
of hanging in your mind when you’re in it’. F’s account of her reading is similar to B’s pres-
ence in her ‘almost over a hundred’ interviews: both suggest an intense period of activity
leading to an almost ghostly familiarity with the material, which haunts the continuing
activity, constituting multiple hanging or suspended possibilities for ‘connection’ or
interpretation.
In thinking about the ‘other’ of these temporalities, it is worth bearing in mind B’s own
account of her project as ‘something that I actually have created – I just completely came
up with this research’ (Interview 2). Respectively, B creates her interviews and F reconﬁ-
gures texts as the objects of their research. As signiﬁers, then, these objects have a narcis-
sistic relation to the subject, reﬂecting a self-created world or discourse. Other participants
cited similarly self-referencing pleasures of the process of research: ‘spending a long time
writing a sentence’ (Participant A); ‘wasting time’ following up entries in the Oxford English
Dictionary ‘even if they’re not going to make it into the ﬁnal paper’ (Participant A); spend-
ing time in library archives (Participant G); or, in M’s case, identifying with the medieval
subjects of the text she was working on: ‘sometimes on winter afternoons when you’ve
been closeted away working, you do feel quite Anchoritic’ (Participant M). The ‘cobwebby’
temporality constructed in relation to these self-created or self-referential signifying
systems has a suspended duration, and an as yet unspeciﬁed objective or teleology.
Is there a political potentiality in this suspended or narcissistic temporality? Or, put
another way, what force might enable self-created or self-referential signiﬁers to ﬁnd a
place in discourse? There are resonances between this state of narcissistic retreat and
Guattari’s (2011) account of the potential political productivity of ‘chaosmosis’, which he
associates with psychosis, but also with childhood and aesthetic production (p. 17). He
describes this as a state of ‘ontological petriﬁcation’ or ‘existential freezing’ located in
the delirium ‘of the dream and of passion’ (p. 20). This ‘extreme degree of intensiﬁcation’
(p. 20) can produce ‘an emergent alteriﬁcation freed from the mimetic barriers of the ego’
(p. 22). Guattari suggests that the interpretation of moments of productive escape involves
a sensibility to the multiplicity of ‘real complexions’ that ‘do not have the same ontological
colouring as each other’ (p. 18). Where the Deleuzian/Guattarian ontological orientation
foregrounds politics as a sensibility to newmaterialities, the Lacanian (anti)epistemological
orientation foregrounds an ethical commitment to ignorance, sensitive to the dangers of
imposing the interpretations of the analyst onto the other (Lacan, 1991; Lapping, 2011,
2013a). This contrasting orientation plays out in the contrasting conceptualisations of
‘time’, as virtuality, or as a traumatic and unknowable Real.
Theorising real or virtual ‘time’: methodological and political implications
Each of the three temporalities marked out in this analysis is constituted in relation to the
O/others of a signifying system. These are fantasmatic temporalities: they are not ‘time’ as
such, but rather timeless, an apparently temporal unfolding that is in Adrian Johnston’s
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words: ‘an epiphenomenal effect dictated by structures that are out of joint with time’
(2005, p. 37). Whether conceptualised as structurally conditioned temporalities or, in
more Deleuzian terms, as elements of a rhythm assemblage, this analysis suggests how
the regulatory processes associated with societies of control produce an intensiﬁed juxta-
position of incongruent subjective perceptions of temporality or duration.
What does this analysis tell us about our current position and about possibilities for the
future? To conclude, it is worth reﬂecting on the theorisation of ‘time’ as either Deleuzian
virtual potentiality or as Lacanian traumatic Real, and on the implications of these specu-
lations for a politics of destabilisation or change. Central to this problematic is the way in
which we understand the (im)possibility of a relation to that which is beyond actualised
discourse.
For Deleuze and Guattari, the materiality of inﬁnitude, the virtual, is the basis for diverse
actualisations (Guattari, 2011, p. 18). The paradoxical status of the virtual as the un-actua-
lised basis of material actualisations can be traced in Deleuze’s account of the living
present:
The synthesis of time constitutes the present in time. It is not that the present is a dimension of
time: the present alone exists. Rather, synthesis constitutes time as a living present… (2004,
p. 97)
This suggests an ontology in which ‘time’ is both constitutive of that which exists but
without existence (‘the present alone exists’). The ontological distinction between
that which is constitutive and that which exists is the distinction between the Deleuzian
‘virtual’ and ‘actual’. Time is virtual, while the temporalities of the living present are
actualisations of the hovering potentiality of the virtual. Within this ontology, the
‘new’ might be brought into being by varying the habitual rhythmic interplay
between existing temporalities of academic practice. To do this the animating but
also stultifying effects of duration must be replaced by the affective capacities of
desire; a shift frequently associated with aesthetic modes of intervention, but also
with the organism’s incomplete but developing awareness of its complex and multifa-
ceted relations to elements of other bodies (Bignall, 2010). It is a politics of fragmentary
but affectively pleasurable engagement. The virtual is not horriﬁc or overwhelming, and
the process of actualisation is one of joy (Bignall, 2010). In the context of academic
research, this process might involve the creation of spaces where signiﬁers produced
within narcissistically suspended rhythms could be shared, away from either teleologi-
cal or chronological linear rhythms; or, alternatively, a more integrated rhythmic
relation between disciplinary and processual technologies (Thompson & Cook, 2014,
p. 712).
In contrast, a Lacanian foregrounding of structure, an apparent apolitical immanence,
can be (mis)understood as a limitation on conceptualisation of a politics of time.
Lacan’s story of temporality reasserts the way duration and urgency are bounded by
unconscious, structural relations to signiﬁers, foreclosing a direct relation to ‘time’.
‘Time’ is beyond language, beyond signiﬁers, overwhelming both in its ﬁnitude (circum-
scribed by birth and death) and its inﬁnitude (amorphous, unstructured, never-ending).
Time in this Lacanian Real has no possibility of symbolic articulation.
However, Johnston (2005) draws on Lacan’s discussion of topological objects to
develop a speculative theorisation of a relation between ‘time’ in the Real and symbolically
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structured temporalities. He proposes that the bends, the points of shift in surface or per-
spective in these impossible topological objects, can be used as an analogy for a kind of
registration of the Real:
In terms of temporality, these turning points are none other than the registration of the tuche
of traumatic Real time. (p. 55)
From this it is possible to extrapolate that it is precisely the bizarre turns and shifts in our
taken for granted experience of ‘time’, of duration and of urgency, that reveal not only the
fantasmatic status of temporality, but also the shift itself as a point of impact of something
else. It is the simultaneous co-existence and incommensurability of the three temporalities
of academic practice traced in my analysis, the points at which they are hinged together,
that indicate something radically beyond. This something else, Real Time, registers without
ever coming within the realm of the knowable.
Here, Johnston (2005) draws attention to the important distinction between Real as
regulative or as constitutive principle. The ﬁrst, which he suggests is the correct reading
of the Lacanian Real, sets a limit to legitimate interpretation. The second ontologises,
and thus might be associated with the Deleuzo-Guattarian conception of the virtual.
The contrasting politics of regulative ignorance and constitutive alteriﬁcation suggest
different stances in relation to irruptions of the Real/virtual. Lacanian anti-epistemology
requires a rigorous reassertion of the ignorance of the analyst; while the more ontological
language of Deleuze and Guattari argues for a sensibility to alternative materialisations of
the virtual.
Finally, the Lacanian position might also suggest that the juxtaposition of bizarrely
incongruent temporalities, intensiﬁed under processes of control, will produce ever
more traumatic registrations of horriﬁc, overwhelming and unknowable Real Time. The
effects of these traumatic encounters with absolute and shattering ignorance are unpre-
dictable: it seems, however, that the obedient position of research, or legitimised knowl-
edge, within institutions of higher education is ever more likely to explode. A Lacanian
position warns against optimism; but alerts us to the need to prepare for the evaporation
of that which we think we once knew.
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